|
Experiment Name
|
Class multiple of
|
Rounds
|
Description
|
Typical behavior
|
Learning outcome
|
Instructions
|
Data R script
|
Figure R script
|
Slides
|
Experiment code
|
Session config code
|
All in one zip
|
| Simultaneous price competition |
5 |
10 |
Groups of 5 students engage in Bertrand price competition. |
Quick convergence to lowest prices. |
Strong forces of market competition, no room for cooperation. | sim_price_comp_instr.docx | - | - | sim_price_comp_slides.pptx | sim_price_comp_code.zip | sim_price_comp_settings.py | - |
| Sequential price competition |
5 |
5 |
Groups of 5 students engage in Bertrand price competition, with price choices made sequentially. |
Quick convergence to lowest prices, later players undercut earlier players. |
Still strong market forces, even when decisions are not simultaneous. Forward-looking and backward induction. | seq_price_comp_instr.docx | - | - | seq_price_comp_slides.pptx | seq_price_comp_code.zip | seq_price_comp_settings.py | - |
| 2-Person price competition (PD) |
2 |
10 |
Groups of 2 students engage in Bertrand Price Competition. (Prisoner's Dilemma) |
Some cooperation, but very little. |
Dominant strategies not to cooperate. | finite_prison_stranger_instr.docx | - | - | - | finite_prison_stranger_code.zip | finite_prison_stranger_settings.py | - |
| Monopoly |
6 |
3 |
One monopolist sets price, 5 buyers decide on quantity to buy. |
Monopolist quickly finds monopoly price maximizing profits, buyers can only adapt. |
Exploitation of monopoly power, welfare loss. | monopoly_instr.docx | - | - | monopoly_slides.pptx | monopoly_code.zip | monopoly_settings.py | - |
| Stackelberg competition |
2 |
3 |
Two firms set quantities sequentially, with one firm moving first. |
First movers set higher quantities than second movers. But also some punishment with high quantity responses. |
First-mover advantage. Backward induction. The value of commitment. | stack_comp_instr.docx | - | - | stack_comp_slides.pptx | stack_comp_code.zip | stack_comp_settings.py | - |
| Stackelberg competition with revision option |
2 |
3 |
Two firms set quantities sequentially, with one firm moving first. However, first mover can revise her choice while the second makes a decision � Cournot competition. |
Relatively slow convergence to Cournot price. Some use cheap talk |
Loss of first mover advantage. Conditions for effective commitment. Cheap talk. Strategic ignorance. | stack_comp_rev_instr.docx | - | - | stack_comp_rev_slides.pptx | stack_comp_rev_code.zip | stack_comp_rev_settings.py | - |
| Price matching policies in Bertrand competition |
5 |
3 |
Groups of 5 students engage in Bertrand price competition, but before they can enable a price matching policy or not, which will automatically match the lowest market price. |
Students quickly learn to set price matching policies and set high prices. However, some students don�t understand and drag whole market down. |
Price matching policies are not good for consumers, they are a strategic signal/commitment to competitors. | price_match_instr.docx | - | - | price_match_slides.pptx | price_match_code.zip | price_match_settings.py | - |
| Dictator Game |
2 |
1 |
One person can freely distribute money between herself and another person. |
Some give nothing, some give something (up to 50%). Average about 20-25%. |
People are not completely selfish. | dictator_game_instr.docx | - | - | dictator_game_slides.pptx | dictator_game_code.zip | dictator_game_settings.py | - |
| Ultimatum Game |
2 |
1 |
One person makes proposal on distribution between herself and another person, other person agrees or disagrees. If disagrees, both receive nothing. |
Modal offer is 50%, lower than 50% are often rejected. |
People anticipate others to be concerned with fairness. | ultimatum_game_instr.docx | - | - | ultimatum_game_slides.pptx | ultimatum_game_code.zip | ultimatum_game_settings.py | - |
| Repeated Ultimatum Game |
2 |
10 |
Same as Ultimatum Game, only with 1/10th of stakes and 10 times repeated. |
Same as Ultimatum game, only higher offers on average. |
People try to teach others that they are fair-minded. | ultimatum_game_rep_instr.docx | - | - | ultimatum_game_rep_slides.pptx | ultimatum_game_rep_code.zip | ultimatum_game_rep_settings.py | - |
| Market Game (2 proposers, 1 responder) |
3 |
5 |
Two players propose split of pie, 1 responder selects which proposal to accept. |
Quick convergence to split where responder gets everything. |
You are only as much worth as you bring to the table (your �marginal� value.) | market_game_instr.docx | - | - | market_game_slides.pptx | market_game_code.zip | market_game_settings.py | - |
| Centipede Game |
2 |
3 |
Classical centipede game |
Moderate convergence to earlier dropouts. |
Limited depth of reasoning. | centipede_game_instr.docx | - | - | centipede_game_slides.pptx | centipede_game_code.zip | centipede_game_settings.py | - |
| Finitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma |
2 |
10 |
Framed as a low/high price competition interaction. |
Some groups cooperate, others don't. End game effect. |
| finite_prison_instr.docx | - | - | finite_prison_slides.pptx | finite_prison_code.zip | finite_prison_settings.py | - |
| Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma |
2 |
? |
Framed as a low/high price competition interaction. Number of rounds needs to be set in advance. |
More cooperation tat in finitely repeated game. |
Shadow of the future allows for cooperation in equilibrium. | infinite_prison_instr.docx | - | - | infinite_prison_slides.pptx | infinite_prison_code.zip | infinite_prison_settings.py | - |
| Chain Store Game |
2 |
1 |
Incumbents fight different entrants, entrants try to enter different markets. |
The more an incumbent has fought in the past, the less likely an entrant will enter. |
The building and value of reputation (to be strong). | chain_store_instr.docx | - | - | chain_store_slides.pptx | chain_store_code.zip | chain_store_settings.py | - |
| Repeated Trust Game - Strangers |
2 |
10 |
Buyers first send mony or not, then seller sends product or not. Each round new partner. |
Cooperation breaks down quickly. |
With no historical information available cooperation is hard to achieve. | rep_trust_instr.docx | - | - | rep_trust_slides.pptx | rep_trust_code.zip | rep_trust_settings.py | - |
| Repeated Trust Game - Strangers with reputation |
2 |
10 |
Same as before, only now history of seller's previous behavior is shown before buyer buys. |
More trust and trustworthiness than without reputation information. |
The building and value of reputation (to be trustworthy). | rep_trust_reputation_instr.docx | - | - | rep_trust_reputation_slides.pptx | rep_trust_reputation_code.zip | - | - |
| Repeated Trust Game - Partners |
2 |
10 |
Same as before, only now the same buyer and seller interact in all rounds. |
Partners interact even more. |
There are also personal relationships which make people trustworthy. | rep_trust_partner_instr.docx | - | - | rep_trust_partner_slides.pptx | rep_trust_partner_code.zip | - | - |
| Japanese Auction |
4 |
1 |
The 5 auctions are usually done in one go, and then all repeated. In this auction, 4 bidders stay in auction while price increases until choose to drop out. Last standing bidder wins at price when 2nd-to-last drops out. |
Rational bidding. Very efficient. |
Revenue equivalence in auctions. | japanese_instr.docx | - | - | japanese_slides.pptx | japanese_code.zip | japanese_settings.py | - |
| English Auction |
4 |
1 |
4 bidders submit bids until no one raises anymore. Last bidder wins at her bid. |
Some jump bids, but still efficient. |
| english_auction_instr.docx | - | - | english_auction_slides.pptx | english_auction_code.zip | english_auction_settings.py | - |
| Dutch Auction (old version) |
4 |
1 |
4 bidders observe decreasing price clock until first decides to bid. Wins as her bid. |
Early bids right at or below value. |
| dutch_instr.docx | - | - | dutch_slides.pptx | dutch_code.zip | dutch_settings.py | - |
| 1st-price Sealed-bid Auction |
4 |
1 |
4 bidders submit sealed bid. Highest bid wins and pays own bid. |
Bids above rational risk-neutral bidding. |
| first_price_auction_instr.docx | - | - | first_price_auction_slides.pptx | first_price_auction_code.zip | first_price_auction_settings.py | - |
| 2nd-price Sealed-bid Auction |
4 |
1 |
4 bidders submit sealed bid. Highest bid wins and pays second highest bid. |
Mostly bids at value, but some bids very high. |
| second_price_auction_instr.docx | - | - | second_price_auction_slides.pptx | second_price_auction_code.zip | second_price_auction_settings.py | - |
| Minimum (weakest link) game |
6 |
5 |
6 bidders each choose a number between 1 and 7, payoff depends on own number and minimum number in group. |
|
| minimum_game_instr.docx | - | - | minimum_game_slides.pptx | minimum_game_code.zip | minimum_game_settings.py | - |
| 6 little coordination games: Head or Tails |
2 |
1 |
This and the folllowing 5 games are usually played in one go one after the other. This experiment asks pairs to choose heads or tails, if same then prize. |
Most choose Heads as focal point (first). |
Coordination problems. Focal points. | coord1_instr.docx | - | - | coord1_slides.pptx | coord1_code.zip | coord1_settings.py | - |
| 6 little coordination games: Choose a number I |
2 |
1 |
Choose one of 6 numbers, all are focal points (somewhat special). |
Not much coordination. |
| - | - | - | - | coord2_code.zip | - | - |
| 6 little coordination games: Nash bargaining |
2 |
1 |
Choose an amount, if both amounts are less or euqal to 100, both receive their requested amount. |
Most choose 50, some are risk averse. |
Many equilibria. | - | - | - | - | coord3_code.zip | - | - |
| 6 little coordination games: Right or left |
2 |
1 |
Choose to drive on the left or right side of the road, when crash then loss of money. |
Coordination on country norm. |
Path dependence. | - | - | - | - | coord4_code.zip | - | - |
| 6 little coordination games: Choose a number II |
2 |
1 |
Choose one of 6 numbers, one is a focal point (stands out). |
Good coordination. |
| - | - | - | - | coord5_code.zip | - | - |
| 6 little coordination games: Tails or head |
2 |
1 |
Asks again to choose heads or tails, if same then prize. |
Because options are reversed, lots of miscoordination. |
| - | - | - | - | coord6_code.zip | - | - |
| Battle of the Sexes |
2 |
3 |
Two people have to choose simultaneously where to go, pefer one of the places but also to be together. |
Lot's of miscoordination, people go for their own. |
Coordination harder because one NE favors one player and the other favors the other player. | battle_sexes_instr.docx | - | - | battle_sexes_slides.pptx | battle_sexes_code.zip | battle_sexes_settings.py | - |
| Market Entry |
2 |
5 |
Two people decide whether to enter a market where there is only plce for one. One player has cost advantage. |
Coordination on NE where cost advantage player enters and other stays out. |
Player wtih high costs must be more aggressive (in mixed NE). | market_entry_instr.docx | - | - | market_entry_slides.pptx | market_entry_code.zip | market_entry_settings.py | - |
| Chicken |
2 |
3 |
Two people drive onto each other, can or straight or swerve. |
Lot's of crashes (lose money). |
Too much aggression. | chicken_instr.docx | - | - | chicken_slides.pptx | chicken_code.zip | chicken_settings.py | - |
| The Hermit and the Socialiser |
2 |
5 |
Two people have to choose their location, one likes to be with the other, the other likes to be alone. (Matching pennies game) One can send cheap talk message. |
Chasing around. Lot's of lying. |
Talk is cheap. Randomization (being unpredictable) and mixed strategies. | hermit_instr.docx | - | - | hermit_slides.pptx | hermit_code.zip | hermit_settings.py | - |
| Penalty Kick |
2 |
5 |
Differently framed matching pennies game: A striker can shoot left or right, the goalie can jum left or right. Goalie can say where he will jump. |
Chasing around. Lot's of lying. |
Talk is cheap. Randomization (being unpredictable) and mixed strategies. | penalty_kick_instr.docx | - | - | penalty_kick_slides.pptx | penalty_kick_code.zip | penalty_kick_settings.py | - |
| Job Market Game (without signalling) |
2 |
3 |
Employer has to offer wage to employee, doesn't know employee skill. |
Quick convergence to low wages. |
| job_market_instr.docx | - | - | job_market_slides.pptx | job_market_code.zip | job_market_settings.py | - |
| Job Market Game (with signalling) |
2 |
5 |
Employee can get a degree, which is less costly for high skill employee. Employer observes degree before offering wage. |
Convergence towards high skill->degree, degree->high wage. |
Bayesian Nash equilibria. Pooling and separting equilibrium. | job_market_signal_instr.docx | - | - | job_market_signal_slides.pptx | job_market_signal_code.zip | job_market_signal_settings.py | - |
| Information Cascade |
set group size |
3 |
X persons (set N cohorts) sequentially receive signals about state of world and ty to match true state. Observe previous choices but not signals. |
Many conform choices (cascade starts), but also many non-conform (break cascades). |
Herding in the wrong direction can be individually rational. | information_cascade_instr.docx | - | - | information_cascade_slides.pptx | information_cascade_code.zip | information_cascade_settings.py | - |
| Repeated Price Comp |
|
|
|
|
| - | - | - | - | rep_price_comp_code.zip | - | - |
| Public Goods |
4 |
5 |
Four mayors decide to invest in joint tram or own streets. |
Intermediate cooperation breaking down over rounds. |
Fragility of cooperation. | public_goods_instr.docx | - | - | - | public_goods_code.zip | public_goods_settings.py | - |
| Public Goods with Conditional Strategies |
4 |
3 |
Three mayors move first, fourth can observe others' investments before investing. |
A little more cooperation, mostly selfish and conditional people. |
Prevalence of conditional cooperation. The carrot. | public_goods_cond_instr.docx | - | - | - | public_goods_cond_code.zip | public_goods_cond_settings.py | - |
| Public Goods with Punishment |
4 |
5 |
After observing each mayor's investment, mayors can destroy the streets of others. |
Higher investments, but no gain in efficiency due to excessive punishment. |
Peer punishment. The stick. | public_goods_punish_instr.docx | - | - | - | public_goods_punish_code.zip | public_goods_punish_settings.py | - |
| Random Hermits |
2 |
3 |
The hermit (matching pennies) game from above, but with incomplete information about type of one player. |
Lot's of noise and uncertainty. |
Bayesian Nash equilibria. | random_hermits_instr.docx | - | - | random_hermits_slides.pptx | random_hermits_code.zip | random_hermits_settings.py | - |
| Penalty Kick with Incomplete Information |
2 |
3 |
The penalty (matching pennies) game from above, but with incomplete information wether the goalie is bribed or not. |
Lot's of noise and uncertainty. |
Bayesian Nash equilibria. | penalty_kick_bribery_instr.docx | - | - | penalty_kick_bribery_slides.pptx | penalty_kick_bribery_code.zip | penalty_kick_bribery_settings.py | - |
| Comittee Agenda Setting 1 |
1 |
3 |
Manager sets agenda for meeting with two other (computerized, honest) managers with different preferences. |
Convergence towards strategi agenda favoring chair. |
Agenda setter can determine meting outcome. | agenda_1_instr.docx | - | - | - | agenda_1_code.zip | agenda_1_settings.py | - |
| Comittee Agenda Setting 2 |
3 |
10 |
Manager sets agenda for meeting with two other real managers with different preferences. |
Stragegic voting, agenda setter adapts. |
Votes can be strategic, agenda can adapt. | agenda_2_instr.docx | - | - | - | agenda_2_code.zip | agenda_2_settings.py | - |
| A green screen with no button, usually put at start |
1 |
1 |
A green screen, usually shown as first screen to indicate that people are connected. Can then be skipped with ""Advance slowest user"". |
|
| - | - | - | - | ready_code.zip | - | - |
| A red screen saying thank you, usually put at end. |
1 |
1 |
A red screen with a thank-you. Usually shown as last screen to indicate end of experiment. |
|
| - | - | - | - | thankyou_code.zip | - | - |
| A screen asking for a second ID, in cs two students share the screen. |
1 |
1 |
A screen collecting an ID number. We used it to ask for the second student's ID in case there are two students are participating jointly as one. |
|
| - | - | - | - | inputsecondid_code.zip | - | - |